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Torres v. Mullin
124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (mem.)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari)
I. Facts
InJulyof 1993, Oklahoma authorities arrested a Mexican national, Osbaldo
Torres ("Torres"), and charged him with murder. Torres was tried in
Oklahoma, convicted, and sentenced to death.2 The Oklahoma Court of Cimi-
nal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.3
In 1999, Tones filed a habeas petition in federal district court.4 Torres
argued, in part, that authorities failed to advise him of rights guaranteed to him
by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention") and
failed to notify the Mexican consular of his arrest.' The federal district court
rejected Tones's assertions and concluded that: (1) Torres procedurally de-
faulted this claim by failing to raise it in his initial state court proceeding; and (2)
Torres failed to establish that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights
prejudiced his defense.6 Both the federal district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined to issue Tones a certificate of
appealability ("(XA").7 Seeking review of the Tenth Circuit's decision, Torres
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari!
Torres argued that the Court should review the existing conflict between
International Court of Justice ("I.CJ.") decisions and the Tenth Circuit's deter-
mination.9 Supporting Torres's petition for certiorari, Mexico filed an amicus
curiae brief."0 In its brief to the Court, Mexico stated that it brought a case
1. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Cc. 562, 563 (2003) (mer.) (Breyer, J., dissenting from a denial
of certiorari.
2. Id
3. Id; se Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3, 26 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming Torres's
conviction and sentence); Torres v. State, 58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (denying
Torres's subsequent application for post-conviction relief).
4. Tors, 124 S. Cc. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5. I d; siv Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 1, 21 U.S.T.
77, 100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 293, 294 (delineating the consular rights of foreign nationals).
6. Tan , 124 S. Ct. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. Id; se Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1148 n.I (10th Cr. 2003) (denying Torres the
opportunity to expand his Supplemental Request for an Expanded Certificate of Appealability).




involving Torres before the I.CJ. and took the position that by convicting and
sentencing Torres, the United States violated the Vienna Convention, which the
United States is bound to follow as part of its domestic law." Mexico urged the
Court to delay deciding Torres's case until the I.CJ. rendered a final decision
resolving the dispute."
I. Hddmg
The United States Supreme Court denied Torres's petition for a writ of
certiorari." Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion from this denial. 4 Justice
Breyer stated that a deferred consideration of this petition should have been
granted in light of the pending resolution of the related case before the I.CJ.
between Mexico and the United States."
III. A nd)sis
In Bmad v G r, 6 the Supreme Court held that, under the Vienna Con-
vention, state and federal courts can apply ordinary procedural default rules to
effectivelyprohibit defendants who fail to raise Vienna Convention violations in
state court from raising these issues in the federal forum.' Additionally, the
Court noted that defendants making claims under the Vienna Convention were
11. Id; se Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), No. 128,
59(a) (I.CJ. Feb. 5, 2003),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/iimus-iorder20030205.PDF [hereinafter
A uma] (holding that the United States "shall take all measures necessaryto ensure that... [defen-
dants including Torres] are not executed pending final judgment"); Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP.
DEF. J. 553 (2003) (analyzing Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States), No. 128 (I.CJ. Feb. 5, 2003),
http://www/icj-cij.org/icjwww/docket/imus/imusorder/ims iorder 20030205.PDF); see also
Amanda E. Burks, Cmdar A ssistam fFonign Do ni : A wiig Dfa dFaon5iig a De e 14
CAP. DEF. J. 29, 35 (2001) (discussing international, state, and federal court decisions implicating
the Vienna Convention).
12. Tor, 124 S. Ct. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The I.CJ.'s order to the United States in
A um on February 5, 2003 was a provisional order pending final judgment of the case.
13. Id
14. Id at 562. Justice Stevens also wrote an opinion not labeled as a dissent but appeanng
to be in disagreement with the denial of certiorai Tones v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919 (2003) (mere)
(respecting the denial of the petition for certioran).
15. Torne, 124 S. C. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
17. Tors, 124 S. Ca. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting); sw28 U.S.C. 5 2254(e)(2) (2000) (stating
that generally an evidentiary hearing will not be permitted "[iyf the applicant has failed to develop
the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings"; part of AEDPA); Breard v. Green, 523 US.
371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (stating that "Breard's abilityto obtain relief based on violations of the
Vienna Convention is subject to [28 U.S.C S 2254(e)(2)], just as anyclaim arising under the United
States Constitution would be").
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not likely to prevail unless they could prove trial prejudice.18 However, both
Torres and Mexico asserted that in the LaGrand Case 9 the I.CJ. authoritatively
interpreted the Vienna Convention differently." Torres and Mexico argued that
because the ICJ.'s decision was authoritative, it bound the Supreme Court and,
therefore, has been incorporated into American domestic law.2
In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that Article VI of the United States
Constitution states that treaties made under the authority of the United States
" 'shall be the supreme Law of the Land.' "22 Additionally, lower courts have
held that the Vienna Convention is self-executing in so far as no additional
congressional legislation is needed for the provisions to become part of the law
of the United States.23 Moreover, the I.C.J. has stated that the Vienna Conven-
tion created individual rights for arrested foreign nationals and that laws of the
United States must allow full effect to be given to the purpose behind which
those rights were intended.24
Second, the Vienna Convention prohibits an implementation of the proce-
dural default rule that would prevent a detained foreign national "from challeng-
ing 'a conviction and sentence by claiming ... that the competent national
authorities failed to complywith their obligation to provide the requisite consular
information without delay.' "25 In LaGrara the I.CJ. stated that regard-
18. Tor, 124 S. Cc. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting); seeBmzn 523 U.S. at 377 (stating that "it
is extremelydoubtful that the violation [of the Vienna Convention] should result in the overturning
of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the
trial" (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991))).
19. LaGrand Case (FRG. v. U.S.), No. 104 (I.CJ. June 27, 2001),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idockt/ igus/igusjudgment/igus-ijudgment 20010625.htm.
20. Tor-, 124 S. Cc. at 563 (Breytr,J., dissenting); seeLaGr 4 No. 104, at 88-91 (holding
that the United States cannot use the procedural default doctrine to avoid enforcing the rights
conferred to foreign defendants under the Vienna Convention).
21. Tons, 124 S. Ct. at 563 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id 563-64 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI); s& U.S. CONST. art. VI (stating "all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land").
23. Tom, 124 S. Ca at 564 (Breyer,J., dissenting); sa, eg, United States v. Torres-DelMuro,
58 F. Supp. 2d 931, 932 (C D. I1 1999) (stating that "the treaty is 'self-executing' in the sense that
there is no need for enabling legislation for the Convention to have the force of law"); S. Exec. Rep.
No. 91-9, App. 1, 5 (1969) (statement of State Department DeputyLegal AdvisorJ. Edward Lyerly)
(testifying, prior to ratification of the Vienna Convention, in front of the Senate).
24. Torr, 124 S. Ct. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting); se Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at
100-01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 293-94 (stating consular rights of foreign nationals); LaGria, No. 104,
at 77, 86-89 (holding that the United States must give full effect to Vienna Convention rights).
25. Torm, 124 S. Ct. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting LaGn±'4 No. 104, at 90)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The United States, by relying on such an assertion, violated the
Vienna Convention. Id The United States cannot rely on a defendant's failure to raise a Conven-
tion claim in a habeas proceeding when the initial mistake was caused by the United States's failure
to carry out its Vienna Convention obligation to inform foreign nationals of their rights. Id (citing
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less of whether the accused was informed of his Vienna Convention rights or the
right to consular assistance, a nation and its nationals" 'were in effect prevented
by the breach of the United States from exercising [these rights], had they so
chosen."' 26 "Finally, Article I of the Convention's Optional Protocol Concern-
ing the CompulsorySettlement of Disputes" states that disputes arising from an
interpretation or application of the Convention will" 'lie within the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice."',, Torres and Mexico asserted
that they could enforce Vienna Convention rights to obtain an appropriate
remedy in spite of the "state-law procedural bars or lack of prejudice" based on
the Protocol, the I.CJ.'s authoritative interpretation of the Vienna Convention,
the fact that the Vienna Convention is self-executing, the I.C.J.'s determination
that its decision is a part of the law of the United States, and the I.CJ.'s holding
in LaGrar 28
Torres and Mexico also pointed to the preliminaryorder issued bythe ICJ.
in response to a petition by Mexico asking the ICJ. to determine whether the
United States violated the Vienna Convention with respect to the treatment it
provided to Torres and other similarly situated defendants.29 The preliminary
order issued bythe ICJ. in Mexico's case stated that the ICJ. "indicate[d]" that
the United States must take measures necessary to ensure that Torres is not
executed before the final judgment is issued.3" Both Torres and Mexico asserted
that in LaGrand the LCJ. held that such a preliminary order "has [a] 'binding
effect' and 'create[s] a legal obligation for the United States.' "31 Before a final
decision is rendered by the I.CJ., Oklahoma can set an execution date within
sixty days of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari.32 Therefore, Tones and
Mexico asked the Court to defer consideration of this issue.33
Based on the briefs submitted, Justice Breyer stated that "Toresis] and
Mexico's arguments seem substantial."34 Due to the strength of the arguments
raised by Torres and Mexico and the absence of a brief directly addressing these
LaGramzi, No. 104, at 1 60, 90-91).
26. Id (quoting LaGiari No. 104, at 74). In LaGrand, the I.CJ. stated that when foreign
nationals are not advised of their Vienna Convention rights without delay and are sentenced to
severe penalties, an apology by the offending government is not sufficient. LaGranm' No. 104, at
123.
27. Toms, 124 S. Ct. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T.
at 326, 596 U.N.T.S. at 488).
28. Id at 564.
29. Idat505;AwuNo. 128,at 8. Seegava/yNath, s"anote 11 (discussinginternational,
state, and federal court decisions implicating the Vienna Convention).
30. Torns, 124 S. Ct. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing A zewa, No. 128, at 59).






arguments byeither the United States or international law experts, Justice Breyer
stated that "there is a realistic possibility" that the court should hear this case. 5
Because of the international implications and the need for more information
upon which to make a decision, Justice Breyer deferred consideration of the
petition for certiorari until the pending I.CJ. case is resolved and further briefing
could occur in light of that opinion. 6
IV. Applciatw m Vbgm
This opinion serves to remind practitioners defending foreign nationals of
the requirement that the government inform detained individuals of their Vienna
Convention rights and contact appropriate consulates. Neglecting pre-trial to
assert the failure of the state to inform the accused of these rights can result in
procedural default. AdditionallyJustice Breyeris apparentlyapprehensive of the
Supreme Court's summarydismissal of Torres's petition for certiorari Recogniz-
ing the conflict between United States precedent and the decisions rendered by
the ICJ., Justice Breyer would have delayed consideration of the grant or denial
of certiorari until the I.CJ. made a final ruling and more information was made
available to the Court.
Meghan H Morgan
35. Id Justice Breyer noted that the United States had filed briefs in opposition to the related
case arguing, in part, that the I.CJ. does not have judicial power in the United States as that power
is clearly vested by the Constitution to the federal courts. id While noting that this statement is
true in general terms, it is unclear whether the I.CJ. has authority, byvirtue of treaties to which the
United States is a party, to authoritatively interpret the rights of the Vienna Convention. Id
36. Toms, 124 S. Ct. at 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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